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Introduction 
The title ‘the dancing Sharma’ is not intended, as 
the heading might suggest, to be an evocation of a 
sacred heirophany or a description of a whirling 
Dervish. It is an elicitation of a memory of Prof. 
Sharma enjoying himself during a relaxed 
moment in the otherwise intense atmosphere of 
the XVIIIth Quinquennial World Congress of the 
International Association for the History of 
Religions in Durban, South Africa August 5-12, 
2000. It points to the rather humorous insight that 
contrary to Marrett’s now famous statement that 
religion is something not so much to be thought 
out as danced (Marrett, 1914) - that dancing is a 
human activity which gives release and enjoyment 
to those scholars who spend their lives thinking 
about religion! The tall, lithe and stately figure of 
the author swaying to the music, surrounded by 
scholars of international standing and dignitaries 
of all kinds is a metaphor for the book. As he 
danced his way through the evening with obvious 
enjoyment and panache, so the book ‘dances’ with 
dexterity and skill among the bevy of concepts 
and scholars whose work he discusses in the book. 
Also, just as there was a particularity about 
Sharma’s dancing style, so there is a notable 
singularity of his contribution to the field of the 
phenomenology of religion in this book. 
 
Survey of the Book: 
The book is comprised of twelve chapters which 
can be further broken into three parts, dealing with 
(1) the phenomenology of religion subjected to 
‘detailed analysis’, (2) the general methodological 
framework of religious studies, and (3) the 
author’s own contribution to the field. The 12 
chapters address (1) the search for terminological 
exactitude: phenomenon (2) the search for 
terminological exactitude: phenomenology of 
religion (3) the phenomenology of religion (the 
removal of ambiguity) (4) the phenomenology of 
religion and the phenomenological movement (5) 
the application of the phenomenological method 
to a single religious datum (6) the phenomenology 
of religion as a phenomenology of families of 
religions (7) towards a phenomenological 
hierarchy of methods in the study of religion (8) 
misconceptions about the phenomenological study 
of religion in the scientific study of religion (9) 
antireductionism and the phenomenology of 
religion (10) some applications of the 
phenomenology of religion (11) philosophical 
phenomenology and the phenomenology of 
religion (12) from the phenomenology of religion 
to a religious way of studying religion? Jacques 
Waardenburg, the distinguished Professor of 
Religion at the University of Lausanne, writes the 
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In my recently completed PhD (‘The Mind of 
Christ? A phenomenological explication of 
personal transformation and cosmic revision in 
Christian converts in Western Australia’, Edith 
Cowan University, 2002) I made reference to 
regretting the delay in publishing of Sharma’s 
book. That delay made the present work 
unavailable to my research at the time. 
Waardenburg, the writer of the Foreword, had told 
me that the book would be the ‘most recent and 
comprehensive overview of the field of the 
phenomenology of religion’ (Devenish 2002, 
124). Happily the publishers have now seen fit to 
make a review copy available. I have discovered 
in my own experience that Waardenburg was right 
when he praised Sharma’s facility as a writer and 
scholar. 
 
Sharma characterizes the phenomenology of 





(4) investigatory iro forms or structures 
(5) interpretive. 
 
In providing these distinguishing features Sharma 
has delivered a knockout blow to those who 
would critique the discipline as discordant and 
without having a central core. The reality is - as 
Sharma has demonstrated - that there is an 
identifiable unity, if not uniformity, within the 
discipline of the phenomenology of religion. 
 
I think the book is well written. It is both 
thoughtful and thought-provoking. It is well 
organised and has a rhythm and style to it which 
makes it eminently readable. What impressed me 
during my reading of the book (it took me 2 full 
days to read) was the breadth of the author’s 
reading and knowledge, the acute nature of his 
understanding of the issues involved, and his 
ability to steer a middle-path between the issues 
raised and the controversies he visits. Sharma has 
an uncanny knack of being able to rehearse the 
key components of an argument and to squeeze 
the best value from them without being caught up 
or lost in the argumentation itself. Of special note 
is Sharma’s clarity of insight and neat 
construction of memorable one-liners, such as, 
“Although Eliade may not be more than a 
phenomenologist of religion, he is not less.” (p. 
239), “philosophical phenomenology and 
phenomenology of religion are different animals 
of the same species” (p. 244), and “the distinctive 
method of the cultural sciences is understanding 
(Verstehen), whereas that of the natural sciences is 
explanation (Erklarung)” [from V. A. Harvey, p. 
122]. This gives the book a didactic quality, 
although the intent of the book is more one of 
tightening up scholars’ conceptions of the 
phenomenology of religion than of writing a 
textbook. It is my assessment however that such is 
the readability and applicability of this work that 
it will in future become the textbook for students 
of the phenomenology of religion. 
 
The book is subject to some repetition and 
exhibits a dependence on Eliade’s Encyclopaedia 
of Religion. Neither of these developments are 
surprising however. Given the complexity of the 
subject-material addressed there is need for the 
repetition of points fundamental to the author’s 
argument. Likewise the repeated dipping into 
Eliade’s Encyclopedia is probably an intelligent 
move given that regardless of the discipline - 
whether it be the history of religions, the 
philosophy of religion or the phenomenology of 
religion - the Encyclopedia is invariably accepted 
as an authoritative source of reliable opinion and 
information. I found Sharma to demonstrate a 
high level of personal and academic integrity 
throughout the book. He clearly acknowledges his 
debt to such authors as Douglas Allen and John 
Arapura where necessary. This integrity is also 
apparent at the intellectual level where, for 
example, Sharma is unable to locate a more 
satisfactory description of studying religion “from 
a religious point of view” (the subject of chapter 
12, pp. 248-274) - and in the light of 
Waardenburg’s recommendation that he “find a 
better phrase” (p. 274), Sharma admits he has 
been unsuccessful in doing so and invites the 
reader to provide one (ibid). Although I concur 
with Sharma when he admits that the idea of 
studying religion “from a religious point of view” 
is “perhaps clearer than the expression used to 
describe it” (ibid ), I too have been unable to 
elucidate a satisfactory phrase which does not 
simply re-state the substance of Sharma’s existing 
configuration of the idea. This inability is in part 
associated with the complexity of the subject-area 
of religion itself. Segal asks the question, “What 
after all is religion?” (Sharma, p.  268).   
 
The book concludes with the unresolved question 
of the “Dilthean paradox” (p. 286) which is 
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maddening to the reader to have a new issue 
introduced in the last few pages of a book and to 
have it left hanging like a Damocles sword. But 
that is the nature of the phenomenon of religion; 
this irresolution signals that the book is not only a 
historical survey of the phenomenology of 
religion, but a critical survey as well (p. 275). 
Consistent with the commitment of the 
phenomenology of religion, Sharma’s intention is 
to keep the perspective of the believer foremost in 
the minds of those studying religion. He holds that 
the insider’s perspective is not to be rejected but is 
in fact the central repository of the phenomenon 
of religion and must be taken seriously.  For the 
phenomenology of religion, it is not God who 
stands at center-stage (because God is not a 
phenomenon available for scientific study); but it 
is the religious believer or community in his 
[their] presentational actions, thoughts, rituals and 
sacred dramas which provides the phenomenal 
material upon which the phenomenology of 
religion feeds. William Cantwell Smith can even 
say, “We do not see a person’s faith, but [we] see 
expressions of it” ( p. 259). 
 
This theme is demonstrated by Kristensen’s oft-
repeated phrase, “Let us never forget that there 
exists no other religious reality than the faith of 
the believer” (p. 41). Although the believer can be 
wrong and the description provided by the 
phenomenologist only an “approximation” (p. 
277) of the believer’s experience and 
commitments, nonetheless it is a close 
approximation and the phenomenology of religion 
therefore lays claim to being scientific in nature. 
The charge - made by the reductionists - that the 
phenomenology of religion is totally subjective is 
mistaken according to Sharma, because anyone 
undertaking the study of religion must allow for a 
degree of ambiguity (because of the nature of 
religion itself), and because any claim to total 
objectivity is built upon an edifice either of 
reductionism, or a complete rejection of the 
insider’s point of view. Further, there are different 
levels at which the study of religion can be 
undertaken; the micro-level (the historical), the 
meso-level (the phenomenal), the macro-level 
(sociological and psychological), and the mega-
level (the hermeneutical and philosophical) (pp. 
116 ff.). Sharma also makes room for a “meta-
level” in the study of religion (p. 159) although 
without further elucidating its characteristics. 
 
I was particularly interested in Sharma’s chapter 
11, “Philosophical Phenomenology and the 
Phenomenology of Religion”. Having read widely 
in the field of Husserlian philosophical 
phenomenology and felt myself to have acquired 
an adequate grounding in that field, when I moved 
across to the phenomenology of religion I was 
confronted with the question, “What is the 
relationship between these two disciplines?” 
Sharma too asks the question and provides useful 
answers. Allen’s five characteristics of 
philosophical phenomenology which have 
particular relevance for the phenomenology of 
religion (pp. 73 & 231ff.), are (1) descriptive in 
nature (2) opposition to reductionism (3) 
intentionality (4) bracketing or epoche (5) the 
eidetic vision. While Sharma discusses these 
widely, he rightly locates the eidetic vision and 
epoche as the two most significant components of 
philosophical phenomenology which have carried 
over into the phenomenology of religion as 
primary components of its method. A comparison 
of Husserl’s (philosophical phenomenology) and 
van der Leeuw’s (phenomenology of religion) (p. 
244) shows how close but how distant these two 
disciplines are. In essence, philosophical 
phenomenology confronts the believer and his or 
her ‘world’ as an external ‘other’ to be described; 
whereas the phenomenology of religion addresses 
the believer by entering his or her ‘world’ from 
the inside with the intention of ‘understanding’ 
their meanings and motivations...something 
philosophical phenomenology can do through 
intersubjectivity but seems often not to want to do. 
 
Finally, Sharma not only rehearses the substance 
of the phenomenology of religion as it has been 
historically conceived. He also makes a 
contribution of his own, around the substance of 
studying religion “from a religious point of view”. 
Sharma insists (with Kristensen) that the 
phenomenology of religion must study religion 
from the believer’s point of view, but in so doing 
it must “never allow its explicit epistemology to 
slide into, or even towards, an implicit ontology or 
‘theology’” (p. 281). At this point I think Sharma 
is breaking new ground but he is also walking into 
a minefield. He consistently laments that the voice 
of the believer has been stifled in the study of 
religion and suggests some helpful strategies for 
ensuring that voice is heard--but he remains 
committed to the scholarly device of looking at 
religious experience ‘as’ an outsider.  
 
It is at this point that I have particular difficulties 
not with what Sharma says as with what he does 
not say. He makes the statement: “theology 
accepts the proposition that the ultimate reality of 
religion is religious ontologically, and first hand. 
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Phenomenology of religion accepts the same 
proposition, but empirically, and second hand” (p. 
257). However there is a raft of scholars who, as 
believers themselves, have wished to understand 
their faith better. Following the Augustinian 
principle in which faith seeks to understand itself, 
they have acquired the tools of phenomenology in 
an attempt to understand the characteristics of 
their own faith through obtaining insights into the 
rituals and sacred objects particular to their own 
religious tradition. Sharma allows no place for 
religious scholars amongst the plethora of scholars 
of religion. In this regard he appears to disallow, 
or at least find discomfort in the important 
scholarship of those older scholars such as Otto 
(1918), Bettis (1969), van der Leeuw (1967), 
Scheler (1972), Luijpen (1964), Maritian (1959), 
Trestemont (1961), Hocking (1912), Dumery 
(1968), Eliade (1957 et al), Berger (1969), Farley 
(1975), Danielou (1957), Stein (1973), Weil 
(1973), and Dupre 1972); and the newer scholars 
of religion such as Westphal (1987), Sokolowski 
(2000), Hart (1992), Ryba (1991) and Willard 
(1998). What if these scholar-believers should 
obtain the tools of phenomenology, and by means 
of employing the phenomenological bracketing 
and eidetic reduction, should uncover features 
essential to their own belief while admitting to the 
doctrines of antireductionism and studying 
religion from a religious perspective? These 
scholars do not fit the standard description hung 
on them by the average scholar of religion, that 
they do not have the language or sophistication 
with which to describe their own interior 
experience or belief. It is my observation that 
listening to such scholars would enable a more 
careful application of the phenomenology of 
religion at a number of levels. 
 
First, such applications will commence at the 
micro-level or the level of one’s own experience. I 
have written elsewhere: 
 
In my view it seems an unwarranted 
restriction of phenomenology to restrict 
it to the broader historical and 
philosophical realms, when it is uniquely 
capable of addressing through 
intersubjective inquiry the processes of 
meaning construction and alteration 
within individuals and sub-groups. In 
this research I am seeking to apply 
phenomenology’s ability to identify and 
elicit meaning in the microcosmic 
dimension of personal religious 
experience (Devenish, 2002, p. 119). 
 
(2) But such scholars are also able to extrapolate 
findings related to the faith they confess from 
their own experience out onto the broader canvas 
of the historical horizons of the macro-level of the 
tradition within which they dwell, so that entire 
religious movements and traditions are addressed 
at the universal or nomothetic level. 
 
(3) If the believer himself or herself is able to 
recognize, on the basis of the epoche, the 
distinction between theology and the 
phenomenology of religion, why is it that 
phenomenology is held to be exclusively the 
domain of scholars of religion, and theology 
exclusively the domain of religious scholars? Can 
there be middle ground? 
 
(4) Philosophers of religion who are religious will 
be eager to speak not ‘for’ God or the gods, but to 
speak ‘out of’ their experience of the Holy, which 
is, after all, the manifestation of the primary 
experience central to the phenomenology of 
religion. So long as the believing 
phenomenologist uses the tools of the 
phenomenology of religion to explore the richness 
of one’s own faith and not in the first place to seek 
to convert others, then it would appear that such 
an endeavour is no longer peculiar but beneficial. 
Waardenburg himself in the Foreword exhibits a 
concern for the “subject’s meaning” or “the study 
of religious constructions of reality.” Is this not 
the fulfilment of the goal towards which the 
phenomenology of religion strives? 
 
(5) The possibility of philosophers of religion who 
are religious studying their own beliefs applies to 
all philosophers of all religions not just to 
Christians, so Sharma’s mimicking of Penner’s 
critique that the phenomenology of religion is 
simply a “theological campaign carried out under 
the banner of religious science” (p. 250) does not 
of necessity apply. 
 
In summary, it is apparent that Sharma has made 
the choice to make use of a ‘scientific’ 
methodology over against the properly ‘religious’, 
yet continues to insist he is studying religion 
“from a religious point of view”. This is 
understandable from the perspective of 
scholarship but extenuates the difficulties 
experienced by those skilled and articulate 
‘religious’ phenomenologists of religion whose 
voices remain muffled and indistinct amidst the 
cacophony of scholars calling us back to “the 
things themselves!” 
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Conclusion: 
I have enjoyed reading Sharma’s To the Things 
Themselves and recommend it to anyone 
interested in the study of religion. I predict the 
book will grow in stature and take a rightful place 
as a required textbook for students of the 
phenomenology of religion in the future, and sit 
with dignity on the shelves of great scholars and 
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